The Independence of Abu Hanifa and His Conflict with Power

Among the most authoritative figures of early Islamic jurisprudence, few embody a model of moral and intellectual independence as powerfully as Abu Hanifa. Born in Kufa in 699 and dead in Baghdad in 767, he became one of the most influential jurists of the formative period, founder of the Hanafi legal school, renowned for the precision of his analogical reasoning, the subtlety of his rational method and the balance with which he approached the complex legal realities of his age. Yet alongside his doctrinal contributions, there is another essential dimension of his legacy: his steadfast resistance to political pressure and his systematic refusal of any public office that might compromise his freedom of judgment. His intellectual formation unfolded in the lively environment of Umayyad Kufa, a city crowded with jurists, theologians, traditionists, merchants and continuous debates. In this ferment, the young scholar grew into a voice respected for integrity and clarity. He never sought public roles, disliked the prestige that came from proximity to rulers and refused the idea that justice should be subordinated to the needs of political power. This attitude drew the attention of various governors who attempted to recruit him into judicial functions, yet he rejected every offer decisively. The turning point came with the rise of the Abbasids. The new regime, eager to reinforce its legitimacy by associating itself with prominent scholars, pressed Abu Hanifa to accept high-ranking positions, including the function of chief judge. He refused, convinced that such a role would force him to issue verdicts molded by political interests even when they contradicted legal principles. Classical sources recount that he openly declared he would not become an “instrument” of the state nor participate in a form of justice twisted to suit the rulers’ objectives. Such defiance was unprecedented. The balance snapped: Caliph al-Manṣūr interpreted his refusal as direct insubordination, and Abu Hanifa was imprisoned, beaten and subjected to long periods of harsh confinement. Many accounts attribute his death shortly thereafter to the suffering endured during his detention. His refusal was not a political gesture in the modern sense but a legal and spiritual act. Abu Hanifa maintained that the task of the jurist was to guard the integrity of divine law and protect the weak from the abuses of authority. For him, the independence of the scholar was indispensable for the correct interpretation of scripture and jurisprudence. This principle shaped the ethos of the Hanafi school, which preserved for centuries a tradition marked by methodological flexibility, attention to social context and a cautious distance from political dominance over religious authority. Thus, the figure of Abu Hanifa stands as a symbol of a moral responsibility that transcends the might of rulers. His example shows that the greatness of a jurist is measured not only by the texts he leaves behind but by the firmness with which he safeguards his inner autonomy. His life teaches that genuine knowledge cannot flourish under the shadow of governmental favor and that justice sometimes requires the courage to pay a high price to remain faithful to one’s conscience.

Roberto Minichini

January 2026